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The Lega Nord, as it’s today known, emerged onto the 
political scene in the mid ’80s as an unknown party vaguely 
dedicated to localist policies. In the years that followed, La Lega 
gained an enormous amount of momentum, bringing political 
scientists and activists into the fold whoZ helped the party 
articulate a clear ideology, and allowed it to expand its influence 
from provincial Northern cities to entire regions.ii By the time 
La Lega won its first major electoral victory in the 1992 Italian 
general election, it was a well-oiled machine that stood for 
federalism, ethno-regionalism, and neoliberal economics. The 
party went through one more significant ideological pivot in 
2013 – incidentally, when Salvini took over as secretary – to 
broaden its appeal still further. In examining the history of La 
Lega, I will argue that the party’s ideological development was 
strategically vote maximizing: It was secessionist when it paid 
to be secessionist, and it was nationalist when it paid to be 
nationalist. 
This paper furthermore attempts to classify the 
ideology of La Lega. With shifts in platform come 
corresponding shifts in ideas, and La Lega is no exception. But 
there are certain undercurrents, like anti-statism, ethno-
regionalism and welfare chauvinism that remain constant 
throughout the party’s life. La Lega began by lofting scathing 
critiques against the Italian central government, which it argued, 
was suffocating the Italian regions with high taxes, supporting a 
welfare state for the South of Italy (the money for which went 
right into the pockets of the mafia), and engaging in 
unprecedented racketeering.iii Indeed, in the late ’80s, La Lega 
was the only party calling out the Italian government for its 
corruption – actions that quickly won the party widespread 
support and gave it a populist edge. But La Lega wasn’t just the 
ideological negative of Rome, it also offered prescriptive 
solutions for Italy. By examining some of their solutions, like 
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Abstract 
Matteo Salvini is the former Deputy Prime Minister, and former Minister of the Interior of Italy. Born in Milan, Salvini joined and 
quickly rose up the ranks of the Young Padanians Movement, a political youth group associated with the newly formed Lega Nord 
political party. Now, Salvini sits on the throne of La Lega, as the party’s secretary and chairman.i Not only is Salvini the formal 
party leader, but he has also shown himself to be extremely popular on social media – using his Twitter account to rabble-rouse, 
organize, and grandstand. While Salvini’s xenophobic and anti-statist rhetoric is certainly worth investigation in its own right, to 
best understand Salvini’s meteoric rise one has to first understand the party he leads. Accordingly, this paper focuses on three 
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federalism, I will argue that La Lega hangs between Roger 
Eatwell’s protest and economic interest theories, and that the 
party can best be described as radical ethno-regionalist and 
populist.iv 
Finally, this paper will examine how globalization is putting 
pressure on La Lega’s ideology. Within Italy, workers are no 
longer split between Communist and Centrist parties as they 
were after the Second World War.v Now, Italian workers are 
mainly split between small business owners and large corporate 
industrial workers. The former group advocates for regional 
isolationism, fearing that globalization will cause them to go out 
of business. But the latter group argues for a more centralized 
government to ensure that Italian corporate industries can 
remain economically competitive in the global market. Both 
groups are traditional sources of La Lega support, and this 
section argues that the party has ideologically dodged the issue, 
turning instead to the immigrant threat and anti-EU rhetoric to 
unify these two constituencies. 
 
HISTORY 
In 1985, a new party appeared on local election ballots 
in the wealthy Northern Italian city, Varese. The group went by 
La Lega Autonoma Lombarda, and it racked in 2.5% of the vote 
and a provincial council seat to boot.vi La Lega Lombarda, to 
which its name was shortened a year later, became so successful 
by its ability to invoke a specific catalogue of regional 
mythology, and by capitalizing on the governmental 
mismanagement in Rome. When Umberto Bossi founded La 
Lega Lombarda, he envisioned the party as the modern political 
heir to the 12th century Lombard League, a medieval alliance of 
Northern Italian city states that banded together in order to 
protect Italy from the threat of conquest by Holy Roman 
Emperor, Frederick I.vii Eight centuries later, the geographical 
appeal of La Lega is still largely focused in the North, 
resembling the territory of the medieval Lombard League. The 
invocation of a Northern Italian defensive alliance represents 
two important seeds of La Lega’s thought. First, is the point of 
regionalism. The pact between these Northern Italian city states 
had nothing to do with the concept of a Nation State. On the 
contrary, the Lombard League was aimed at self-preservation 
for their own city states much more than they were aimed at the 
protection of “Italy,” or “Italianicity.” In the late ’80s, La Lega 
would adopt the same rhetoric of undermining the Nation State, 
claiming that regional identities were far more important. The 
second point is that the pact represents the ideal centrality of 
government. The city states of the Lombard League formed a 
joint organization to provide collective military defense, and to 
protect against foreign invaders. All other powers were left to 
the autonomous city states. Bossi’s Lega would argue for a 
similar level of devolution, leaving to the central Italian 
government only the “indispensable: foreigners, defense, and 
currency.”viii 
To develop a political program worthy of such a 
mythology, Bossi brought in a firebrand Professor of Political 
Science, Gianfranco Miglio, who argued that the modern 
conception of the Nation State was a throwback to authoritarian 
absolutist regimes, and was therefore wholly “fictitious,” 
(Miglio 1991, 140). Miglio laid the groundwork for an early 
comprehensive ideology for the budding party arguing that: “I 
came to the conclusion that, as far as ‘Nations’ go, ‘large 
nations’ don’t exist: the more they want to extend the confines 
of a presumed ethnic homogeneity, the more they end up 
distancing themselves from their authentic ethnic roots. If those 
roots are strong, they necessitate a nation of modest 
dimensions,” (Miglio 1991, 140). The upshot of Miglio’s 
philosophy is that the concept of “Italy,” as a modern Nation 
State was not only arbitrary, but actually ethnically 
disingenuous. The more “spontaneous (and true)” nations, were 
those “held together not by grand rulers, or by ideals, but by a 
tiny net of numerous affinities, and by ritualized daily habits,” 
(Miglio 1991, 141). The key implication here is that the idea of 
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a state is only legitimate if it caters to its citizens’ “authentic 
ethnic roots.” La Lega would come to claim that all Italians from 
the South, and particularly from Sicily, were ethnically different 
and thus should be part of a different State.ix Of course, La Lega 
never specified what specifically differentiates the ethnicity of 
a Sicilian from that of a Milanese. Nevertheless, the philosophy 
that Miglio planted took root, and La Lega soon began arguing 
for the secession of Northern Italy from the rest of the peninsula. 
They called their state “La Padania,” and it covered all 
the territory north of the Po river. Bossi had to carefully step 
around all explicit talk of secession at his rallies to avoid being 
arrested, but in the early ’90s, 
when Italy’s massive crackdown 
on political corruption known as 
Tangentopoli began, La Lega 
emerged as a country favorite, and 
Bossi threw caution to the wind. At 
the culmination of a rally in Venice 
in 1996, Bossi declared that 
Padania was seceding from the rest 
of Italy: “the Italian state has constrained, by deceit, the people 
of Padania to succumb to systematic exploitation of their 
economic resources, finances, and products of their everyday 
work only to squander it all on welfare programs, clientelism, 
and the mafia of the south,” (Bossi 1996, 1). Padania didn’t end 
up seceding, but the political crisis that followed Bossi’s 
declaration led to a watershed moment in Italian politics: for all 
its xenophobic rhetoric, La Lega was giving voice to a real anger 
that regular Italians had. 
According to a poll in 2010 (fourteen years after 
Bossi’s declaration of secession), 35% of Italians favored 
secession (61% of Northern Italians did), and 58% of Italians 
favored federalism.x La Lega adapted to this change. Instead of 
pushing for secession, Bossi began pushing more strongly for 
federalist reforms, getting the Bassani laws passed as a result. 
But as La Lega saw less and less of the national vote in the early 
21st century, it ultimately became time to pivot ideologically to 
stay afloat. Shifts in radical party ideology typically occur in 
response to a period of party entrenchment. As La Lega 
politicians got more experience governing in parliament, they 
had to make concessions to establishment parties – like Silvio 
Berlusconi’s Fratelli d’Italia – in order to remain respected as 
serious parliamentary players. These concessions may have 
helped La Lega govern, but they directly contradicted the 
populist rhetoric the party was feeding its voters: that the elites 
in Rome were untrustworthy and out of touch with the needs of 
“real” Italians. This phenomenon is called inclusion-
moderation, and it stipulates that once 
elected, right-wing populist parties 
temper their radicalism since, 
“cooperation with [mainstream] 
parties is their most likely ticket into” 
a coalition (Akkerman et al. 2016, 4). 
The paradox radical-right wing parties 
generally face is that their electoral 
appeal is directly proportional to their 
anti-establishment bent, but the more anti-establishment parties 
are, the less effectively they can enter government and broker 
with other political factions to deliver on their promises. This 
problem isn’t unique to La Lega, either. Parties like France’s 
Front National, Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland, and the 
Netherlands’ Party for Freedom, are all faced with competing 
incentives: To radicalize, and thus maximize votes, or to 
compromise, and thus maximize policy influence.  
Nevertheless, once La Lega signaled that it was open to 
compromise with mainstream parties, its secession narrative 
went out of vogue. And so, when Salvini took over as chairman 
of the party in 2013, he formally abandoned all appeals to the 
mythical Padania, and gave up secession, too. Instead, he 
substituted federalism for anti-immigrant rhetoric, and turned 
La Lega’s appeal from localism into nationalism. La Lega had 
always asserted that the unique Padanian ethnicity merited 
 
“For all its xenophobic 
rhetoric, La Lega was 
giving voice to a real anger 
that regular Italians had.” 
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separation from the South of Italy. But with increased 
globalization, and refugee influxes, La Lega had to change its 
in-group. Under Salvini, La Lega asserted that the Italian Nation 
State, and “Italian-ness” had to be protected from foreigners. 
The strategy paid off because in the 2019 European Parliament 
election, La Lega won 34% of the national vote – a landslide.xi 
The upshot is that La Lega went where the votes were. When it 
was politically expedient to be secessionist, they were, and 
when they had to embrace the protection of the Italian Nation 
State in order to appeal to more people, they did so as well. In 
such a sense, La Lega is a vote maximizing party that is 
ideologically flexible if there is enough electoral clout at stake. 
 
IDEOLOGY 
The protest thesis in Roger Eatwell’s Ten Theories of 
the Extreme Right, explains parties that are a “negative attack 
on the political establishment,” “lack any serious ideology,” and 
are, “vehicles for expressing discontent with the mainstream 
parties,” (Eatwell 2003, 48). Although La Lega certainly began 
with significant protest rhetoric, it also offered concrete policy 
prescriptions and reforms which move it beyond an exclusively 
protest category. While Eatwell’s protest thesis defines parties 
as non-ideological, Bossi describes La Lega as “post-
ideological,” that is, not confined by traditional partisan 
doctrines.xii But even as the party has evolved, La Lega has 
always been anti-statist. This anti-statism explains both why La 
Lega rose to the political scene so strongly in the early ’90s, and 
how La Lega has been able to sustain itself in more recent years. 
The Tangentopoli scandal in 1992 ideologically 
validated La Lega.xiii As historian Paul Ginsborg notes, “by 
1985, the Italian public debt reached 84.6% of the country’s 
GDP… historic inefficiency and waste in the public sector had 
joined with increased spending on welfare… to produce a 
spiraling deficit,” (Ginsborg 2003, 409). Italian voters, 
particularly in the Northern industrial powerhouse region of 
Lombardy, were deeply discontented with Rome’s fiscal 
management and wanted to clean house. That discontent at 
governmental corruption, as well as a healthy prejudice against 
Italy’s Mezzogiorno region, provided fertile ground for La 
Lega’s populist ideology to take root. La Lega had risen to the 
scene fashioning itself as “the scourge of the degenerative 
practices of the political élite,” (Bull & Gilbert 2001, 18). And 
now, with the indictment of so many politicians, La Lega’s 
charges of rampant clientelism and irresponsible spending were 
brought to bear. La Lega seized on its electoral surge of 1996 to 
join a coalition government with Silvio Berlusconi, and push 
unrelentingly for federalism. Bossi’s party wanted what Miglio 
described as the “authentic,” “small,” states that had more fiscal 
autonomy and would be able to make their own regional laws. 
But this ideological commitment to federalism was really a 
smoke screen over the deeper distaste with the fact that the 
North ended up footing the bill for the South’s welfare 
assistance – a distaste much more in line with Eatwell’s 
economic interest thesis.xiv Eugenio Scalfari, the founder of the 
Italian newspaper, La Repubblica, described just this when he 
said that the “‘desire for autonomy’” comes from this sentiment: 
“‘we’re rich because of our merits, hence we want to govern 
ourselves alone,’” (Villone 2019, 10). Thus, La Lega’s 
ideology, if nominally committed to federalism, was really 
coded with a deep ethno-regionalism that fueled resentment 
against the Central Italian State. That resentment is best 
summed up by La Lega’s nickname for Rome: Roma Ladrona 
(Rome, the monstrous thief). 
The protest element was “clearly important in the initial 
rise of La Lega, [but it] does not explain the party’s continued 
success,” (Zasove 2011, 41). Although ethno-regionalist by 
design, La Lega sustained itself by a populist anti-statism that 
capitalized on a “hostility to the welfare state and to a 
multicultural society,” (Bull & Gilbert 2001, 47). The difference 
now, as before, is one of scale. La Lega was against the Italian 
Nation State when it was predominantly a protest party, but in 
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the 21st century, La Lega has expanded its notion of “the State” 
to include supranational organizations like the European Union. 
Indeed, since the Dublin Agreement – which said, among other 
things, that refugees had to be kept at their ports of entry – 
Brussels has been the perfect scapegoat for La Lega. La Lega 
has strategically weaponized the “insecurity,” and 
“displacement,” of Italians and turned the massive influx of 
refugees into a narrative of EU-sanctioned invasion.xv 
In both cases, La Lega is characterized by an anti-
statism resulting from economic anger at subsidizing the South, 
and anger at the European Union for saddling Italy with 
hundreds of thousands of refugees. In such a sense, La Lega falls 
between Eatwell’s protest and economic interest theories. To 
this model, I argue that the labels “ethno-regionalist” and 
“populist” should be added because of the party’s hatred of the 
South, and because of its anti-immigrant xenophobia. 
 
GLOBALIZATION 
I have argued that La Lega is essentially vote maximizing. It 
adapts its ideology if it is politically expedient to do so, and it 
keeps its ideology if it is not. But the forces of globalization are 
placing enormous pressure on La Lega’s ideologically adaptive 
strategy. Here, I argue that La Lega dodges the problem of 
economic globalization, opting instead, to unite its voting base 
along a class-cutting cleavage: the immigrant threat. 
The anxiety of an increasingly globalized world affects 
the many cross sections of La Lega’s voting base differently. 
Broadly speaking, La Lega’s supporters are either petit 
bourgeoise – small business owners in northern Alpine cities – 
or corporate industrialists – business tycoons and leaders of 
international firms. These two classes have distinct responses to 
globalization: the small business owners fear that international 
corporations will price gauge, driving them out of business, 
while the corporate tycoons welcome the challenge of 
globalization, and want to compete on the international scene. 
Because of these different reactions to globalization, both 
classes have distinct views of the role of the State. The small 
business owner, “demands more fiscal and political autonomy,” 
while larger corporate leaders are, “looking for a more central, 
statist approach to contending with other European powers. One 
is parochial, the other is globalized,” (Bull & Gilbert 2001, 149). 
In the midst of this crossfire, La Lega has to carry out a delicate 
balancing act if it wants to hold on to as many of its supporters 
as possible. The central dilemma of La Lega’s position in the 
globalized world is that, for the first time, it cannot pivot 
exclusively to either the global defense or to the regional 
defense. The paradox can best be summed up by: “Today [La 
Lega] seems reduced to defending the local against both the 
national and the global,” (Bull & Gilbert 2001, 148). 
Instead of addressing the issue head on, La Lega has turned to 
the immigrant threat to unite both the small business owner and 
the corporate business man. By closing the Italian ports to 
African migrant ships last summer, for example, Salvini 
redirected the economic anxieties that both business classes feel 
onto the foreign “other.” This out-group scapegoating is a 
particularly effective strategy from the radical right playbook, 
and allows La Lega to avoid addressing the logical 
inconsistencies inherent in its localist ideology. 
 
CONCLUSION 
By examining the history of La Lega, I argue that the party was 
motivated by a mix of discontent with the political 
establishment of Rome, and by the economic frustration of 
having to fund a welfare state for the South of Italy. Those 
frustrations and discontents have morphed over the years, and 
the party’s platform has followed suit. Indeed, the party of Bossi 
advocated for secession of the mythical Padania from the rest of 
Italy, and now the party of Salvini has floated the idea of 
“Italexit,” from the EU. The upshot is that for all of La Lega’s 
5
Landino: The Giant Under Salvini’s Feet: An Analysis of La Lega
Published by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2020
   
        YURJ | yurj.yale.edu                     
Social Sciences 
   6  
 
     SOCIAL SCIENCES | Political Science                 VOL. 1.1 | Sept. 2020 
political adaptations, there has been a persistent undercurrent of 
anti-statism, ethno-regionalism, and neoliberal economics. 
 Furthermore, globalization has placed tremendous 
pressure on La Lega in terms of placating a deeply divided 
electoral base. La Lega established itself as a formidable 
ideological opponent on the Italian political scene in the ’80s, 
and has since lost the moral high ground. Primarily concerned 
with maximizing votes, La Lega has turned to anti-EU 
sentiment and anti-immigrant rhetoric to unite its voting base. 
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